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Introduction 
The Indoor Management Rule is a rule at company law1 which has had an interest-
ing history of development2 within Australia. The rule allows outsiders3 dealing 
with a company to make assumptions about the internal consistency of decisions 
made by a company with its rules. 
The purpose of this paper4 is to consider the extent to which the common law 
Indoor Management Rule due inquiry exception applies in transactions ex post the 
introduction of s.l64(4)(b) of the Corporations Law. The paper will briefly outline 
the development of the indoor management rule within the Australian jurisdiction 
and consider the application of significant recent cases relevant to the due inquiry 
exception. The paper concludes with the view that the common law Indoor Man-
agement Rule operates in addition to the statutory Indoor Management Rule when 
considering transactions where an inquiry ought to have been made.5 
* Lecturer, Law School, University of Queensland. 
1 Note the comments of Mason J in Northside Developments Pty Ltd v. Registrar General (1990) 64 
ALJR 427 at 434 where he felt that it made little difference whether the Indoor Management Rule 
(in its common law form) was a subset of agency law or an organic principle of company law. 
2 Commencing originally with English common law. 
3 "Outsider" being a person who is neither a company officer nor a company member. 
4 This paper was presented at the AAANZ Conference in Christchurch New Zealand in July 1996.. 
It relies upon the contents of work submitted for coursework assessment and draws substan-
tially upon a paper presented to the Corporate Law Teachers' Conference (6-8 February 1994). 
5 This paper seeks to provide a view on the possible outcome of the continued application of the 
common law. For a summary of points from the various cases see Law, LJ 'Security Transactions 
With Companies: Mitigating The Effect Of Defective Execution', The Queensland Law Society 
Journal, Volume 25, Number 5, October 1995, at 417. 
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The Indoor Management Rule 
The Indoor Management Rule was established at common law in the case of Royal 
British Bank v. Turquand6. In Turquand the Court allowed the outsider to make the 
assumption that company officers had duly complied with the company's rules7. 
The directors of the company gave a guarantee to their bankers for borrowing with-
out complying with their company's usual requirement of a shareholders' general 
resolution of approval. The company sought to rely on the absence of shareholder 
approval to avoid payment. The Court rejected this and found for the bank on the 
basis that the bank was entitled to assume that the borrowings were duly author-
ised. Accordingly the basis of this decision became known as the "rule in Turquand's 
case" and latterly as the "Indoor Management Rule". 
The exceptions to the common law Indoor Management Rule8 were the Doc-
trine of Constructive Notice9, actual knowledge10, due inquiry11 and forgery.12 It is 
necessary to more fully consider the due inquiry exception at common law in order 
to understand its significance with respect to the current operation of the statutory 
exception contained in s.l64(4)(b). 
The Due Inquiry Exception at Common Law 
Due inquiry operated as an exception to the Indoor Management Rule at common 
law on the basis that an outsider was not entitled to make the presumption of regu-
larity if the circumstances were such that the outsider should have inquired further, 
per Lord Simonds in Morris v. Kanssen13 where he stated that an outsider: 
6 (1856) 6 E&B 327. 
7 At that time companies were incorporated by a specific Act of Parliament with a set of rules akin to 
articles called the Deed of Settlement. 
8 The Doctrine of Ultra Vires is an aligned subject area which is beyond the scope of consideration 
in this paper. Briefly, Ultra Vires allowed a company to avoid being bound by a transaction which 
was "beyond its power"; see Re Haven Gold Mining Co (1882) 20 Ch D 151. Interestingly, despite 
the attempts of s.161 and s.162 of the Corporations Law to abolish the doctrine, it persists in 
limited scope, notwithstanding the seemingly express explanation of the meaning of s.161 and 
s.162 given in s.160; see ANZ Executors & Trustee Company Ltd v. Qintex Australia Ltd & Anor 
(1990) 8 ACLC 791. 
9 The Doctrine of Constructive Notice applied to preclude an outsider from relying upon a compa-
ny's actions where a reading of the public documents of the company would have made it clear that 
the outsider could not rely on the Indoor Management Rule, notwithstanding the actual state of 
the outsider's knowledge; see Ernest v. Nicholls [1857] VI HLC 401. 
10 An outsider was precluded where s/he had relevant actual knowledge of the company's rules and 
sought to make a contrary reliance on the basis of the Indoor Management Rule; see Howard v. Patent 
Ivory Manufacturing Co (1888) 38 Ch D 156 and Biggerstaffv. Rowatt's Wharf Limited [1896] 2 Ch 93. 
11 Due inquiry extends the ambit of actual knowledge by requiring an outsider to make further in-
quiries to determine the regularity of the transaction where the circumstances of the transaction 
are such as to put the outsider on notice; see Morris v Kanssen [1946] AC 459 and Custom Credit 
Holdings Ltd v. Creighton Investments Pty Ltd (1985) 3 ACLC 248. 
12 An outsider was precluded from making the assumption of regularity of an instrument where that 
instrument was forged; see Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated [1906] AC 439. 
13 [1946] AC 459. 
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"...cannot presume in his own favour that things are rightly done if inquiry that he ought 
to make would tell him that they were wrongly done".14 
In Custom Credit Holdings Ltd v. Creighton Investments Pty Ltd15 a decision of 
Clarke J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the question as to due sealing 
of leases by corporate execution arose for consideration. The leases were to be 
executed in accordance with the company's (Rohn Products Pty Ltd) articles which 
required a directors' resolution. The leases appeared to be duly executed and were 
accepted as such by the outsider (Custom Credit). Clarke J held that Custom Credit 
could not rely on the apparent validity of the execution because they had been put 
on notice. This was so because a resolution had not been passed by the company. 
Indeed one of the directors (whose signature was necessary) was clearly reluctant 
to execute the leases16 due in part to advice given by his solicitor. Clarke J stated 
that: 
It is plain from... [the] facts that prior to the...[outsider] accepting the leases its officer 
was appraised of the fact that one of the two directors had not approved the execution 
and his solicitor was questioning its validity. In my opinion the outsider was put on 
notice of a probable irregularity and, having failed to make any further inquiry or taken 
any other steps to satisfy itself as to the validity of the execution, is unable to rely on 
the indoor management rule.17 
Because the leases were executed in 1983, before the introduction of the statu-
tory Indoor Management Rule, the common law Indoor Management Rule due in-
quiry exception operated to preclude the outsider from relying on the apparent 
valid execution of the lease documents. 
Thus where an outsider has knowledge which gives them reason to inquire as 
to the internal matters of the company and they seek to rely instead on the pre-
sumptions allowed by the Indoor Management Rule, then the outsider will not be 
able to so rely. This proposition was clearly supported by Kirby P in Registrar-
General v. Northside Developments Pty Ltd & Ors18 where he cited Wright L with 
approval19 stating that: 
Whatever may be the exact scope of the rule in Turquand's case Tthink it is quite clear 
on principle and on the authorities—that it can never be relied upon by a person who is 
put on inquiry. The rule proceeds on a presumption that certain acts have been regu-
larly done, and if the circumstances are such that the person claiming the benefit of the 
14 Ibid at 475. 
15 (1985) 3 ACLC 248. 
16 Ibid at 254. 
17 Ibid at 255. 
18 (1989) 7 ACLC 52. 
19 In B Lippett (Liverpool) Ltd v. Barclays Bank Ltd (1928) 1 KB 48 at 56. 
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rule is really put on inquiry, if there are circumstances which debar that person from 
relying on the prima facie presumption, then it is clear...that he cannot claim the benefit 
of the rule'.20 
Australian Consideration of the Indoor Management Rule 
The Australian High Court approved the common law Indoor Management Rule in 
the case of Albert Gardens (Manly) Ltd v. Mercantile Credits Ltd21 and took the op-
portunity to make significant comment in the case of Northside Developments Pty 
Ltd v. Registrar-General.22 The latter case remains an important reference for the 
operation of the common law Indoor Management Rule today because of its com-
ments on the due inquiry exception. Of continuing interest is the statement by 
Mason CJ:23 
"What is important is that...the rule in Turquand's case...[gives] sufficient protection to 
innocent lenders and other persons dealing with companies, thereby promoting busi-
ness convenience and leading to just outcomes..[which calls for] a fine balance of com-
peting interests To hold that a person dealing with a company is put on inquiry when 
that company enters into a transaction which appears to be unrelated to the purposes of 
its business and from which it appears to gain no benefit is, in my opinion, to strike a fair 
balance..."24 
The current form of the Indoor Management Rule in Australia is found within 
the Corporations Law in s.164. In Barclays Finance Holdings v. Sturgess & Ors25 
Wood J stated that the statutory provision was introduced to clarify the common 
law position rather than to make a new rule.26 The statutory provisions were 
introduced to apply from 1 January 198427 The statutory exceptions to the Indoor 
20 Supra n.18 at 60. 
21 (1973) 131 CLR 60. 
22 (1990) 64 ALJR 427. 
23 Also cited at greater length by Law, L, 'Security Transactions With Companies: Mitigating The 
Effect Of Defective Execution', The Queensland Law Society Journal, Volume 25, Number 5, 
October 1995. 
24 Supra n.22 at 434. 
25 (1985) 3 ACLC 662. 
26 See Barclays Finance Holdings v. Sturgess & Ors (1985) 3 ACLC 662 at 667 where Wood J stated 
that "There can be little doubt that [s.164 was] enacted, inter alia, to clarify and codify the indoor 
management rule developed from the decision in Royal British Bank v. Turquand...; to overcome 
the distinction drawn in Morris v. /Cawssew...between defective appointments and non-existent 
appointments; to overcome the view arising out of Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated...that the 
indoor management rule cannot assist in the case of forgery; and to codify the rule in Howard v. 
Patent Ivory Manufacturing Co...to the effect that a third party could not take advantage of the 
indoor management rule if he had notice, actual or constructive that the person with whom he was 
dealing lacked the authority of the company". 
27 Introduced as ss.68A-68D of the various State Companies Codes, followed by ss. 164-166 of the 
Corporations Law from 1 January 1991. Note that s.165 abolishes the Doctrine of Constructive 
Notice and s.166 details the forgery exception to the Indoor Management Rule. 
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Management Rule are contained in s. 164(4) which precludes reliance by an out-
sider in the circumstances of actual knowledge, and in limited circumstances of 
inquiry, particularly: 
164(4)(a) "the person has actual knowledge that the matter that, but for this subsec-
tion, the person would be entitled to assume is not correct; or" 
164(4)(b) "the person's connection or relationship with the company is such that the 
person ought to know that the matter that, but for this subsection, the person would 
be entitled to assume is not correct." 
The actual knowledge exception in s. 164(4)(a) is clearly a restatement of the 
actual knowledge exception to the Indoor Management Rule at common law. Sec-
tion 164(4)(b) however, appears to be narrower than the due inquiry exception at 
common law requiring some sort of "connection or relationship" as a prerequisite 
for an outsider to be put on inquiry. Section 164(4)(b) is clearly critical for outsid-
ers, particularly bankers in understanding the ambit of protection which borrowing 
companies are given by the statute. The Explanatory Memorandum to S.164(5)28 
does not provide assistance in seeking to determine a clear interpretation of the 
ambit of operation of the section.29 It is therefore necessary to refer to the case 
decisions which have specifically considered the ambit of s.l64(4)(b). 
Relevant Cases Considering the Statutory Indoor 
Management Rule 
Unfortunately the cases considering the Statutory Indoor Management Rule have 
not been consistent in their application of s. 164(4)(b). This presents difficulty for 
those seeking to rely,30 since there is uncertainty with respect to the ambit of in-
quiry which financial institutions are to make in taking security.31 A consideration of 
these cases now follows. 
» 
Lyford v. Media Portfolio Ltd 
In Lyford v. Media Portfolio Ltd32 the statutory Indoor Management Rule was 
28 A similar provision relating to the acquisition of property from the company. 
29 The Explanatory Memorandum: Corporations Bill 1988, paragraph 571 states that: "...A person 
dealing with a company, or with a person who has acquired, or purports to have acquired, title to 
property from a company, will not be entitled to make assumptions under Bill sub-cl. 164(3) where 
the person knows or ought to know that the assumption is incorrect". 
30 Including bankers taking security over company assets. 
31 For a more general discussion of third party security taking, see Bryan Horrigan, Third Party 
Securities — Theory, Law and Practice' in Enforcing Securities JA Greig and B Horrigan The Law 
Book Company Limited 1994. 
32 (1989) 7 ACLC 271. 
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considered with respect to a transaction where funds were advanced by one com-
pany (Broadlands) to another (Media) in the absence of compliance with the latter's 
articles33. 
When Media failed to make the required loan repayments it sought to preclude 
Broadlands' reliance on the statutory Indoor Management Rule34 on the basis that 
the transaction in question was executed in a manner contrary to the usual way in 
which the two companies dealt. 
Nicholson J. considered the meaning of "connection or relationship" stating 
that: 
Section [164(4)(b)] refers to knowledge a person ought to have by reason of his connec-
tion or relationship with the company and not to knowledge which he ought to have 
because something in the particular transaction would put a reasonable person on en-
quiry. The focus of para, (b) is on the nature of the "connection or relationship with the 
company". In my view, these words require reference to the facts which show the na-
ture of that connection or relationship and an assessment of whether that connection or 
relationship was such as ought to have produced the state of knowledge referred to in 
para, (b).35 
Therefore because Media's reference to matters of the transaction were to wider 
circumstances and not to the "connection or relationship" with Media, Broadlands 
was allowed to rely on the statutory Indoor Management Rule.36 Thus the interpre-
tation of the statutory exception contained in s 164(4)(b) given by Nicholson J was 
narrower in application than the common law due inquiry exception,37 finding that 
Broadlands had no "...legal or non-arm's length connection or relationship. 
...[and]...was not a director, secretary, shareholder or employee of the...[company]."38 
This interpretation of the statute therefore gives an outsider greater reliance on 
the statutory Indoor Management Rule than the previous position at common law. 
This narrower interpretation of the statute is contrary to the viewer of Gummow J 
in Australian Capital Territory Pty Ltd v. Minister for Transport & Communications 
33 The articles required that the seal only be applied after a resolution of the board of directors or 
after a resolution of a committee of directors. 
34 Pursuant to the equivalent of s.l64(4((b). 
35 Supra n.32 at 281. 
36 (1989) 7 ACLC 271 at 281 where Nicholson J stated that the defendants contentions are "substan-
tially not directed to...[the outsider's]..."connection or relationship" with the...[company]. Rather, 
they are directed to facts which are said to give notice of irregularities such as should have led to 
further enquiry. The argument therefore appeals to the rule of common law and not to the content 
of para. (B) in the terms in which it is enacted". 
37 (1989) 7 ACLC 271 at 281 where Nicholson J stated "it looks to a far too narrow factual basis to 
characterize the "connection or relationship" between...[the outsider]...and the...[company]. It is 
necessary to look at all the facts and circumstances of the connection or relationship between the 
person and the relevant company. The definitions of "connection" and of "relationship" in the 
Shorter Oxford English dictionary (1973) at pp.401 and 1786 are supportive of this as, in my opin-
ion, is the statutory context". 
38 Supra n.32 at 281. 
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& Ors39 where he stated that: 
But [s 164] appears not to be so much a comprehensive code as a provision designed to 
repair the failings of the common law. In these circumstances..it would be ironic if a 
legislative attempt to correct defects in the common law resulted in other flaws becom-
ing ossified in the common law. Whilst [s.164] in some of its operations undoubtedly 
clarifies the rule in Turquand's case and deals more effectively with the mischief and 
inconvenience to which the rule was directed, nevertheless there remains scope out-
side [s.164] for the development of the rule in Turquand's case.40 
Bell Resources Holdings Pty Ltd v. Commissioner for ACT Revenue 
Bell Resources Holdings Pty Ltd v. Commissioner for ACT Revenue Collections41 con-
cerned an appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to the Federal Court of 
Australia with respect to the statutory Indoor Management Rule. Jenkinson J. con-
sidered circumstances where two natural persons affixed the seal of both the 
transferor and transferee companies, one of those natural persons being the secre-
tary of both companies, signing in compliance with each of the company's articles of 
association. His Honour was of the view that: 
the "connection" and the "relationship" of each of...[the natural per sons]...and the trans-
feree company with the transferor company were such that each of those three ought to 
have known that the document had not been duly sealed by the transferor company.42 
Accordingly, the transferee company was precluded by s 164(4)(b) from relying 
upon the statutory Indoor Management Rule. 
Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd v. Occidental Life Nominees Pty Ltd 
In Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd v. Occidental Life Nominees Pty Ltd43 the plaintiff 
(Brick and Pipe) was acquired by the Goldberg group with the Brick and Pipe's 
shares held by a Goldberg subsidiary (Arnsberg Pty Ltd). Brick and Pipe was sub-
sequently used to guarantee funds advanced to another Goldberg group company, 
Spersea Pty Ltd. Brick and Pipe did not receive any benefit from giving the guaran-
tee. After the failure of the Goldberg group Brick and Pipe asserted that the out-
sider financier (Occidental) was precluded from relying on the Indoor Management 
Rule. The court found in favour of the financier.44 
Interestingly, in Brick and Pipe the court felt that s.l64(4)(b) did not include 
39 (1989) 7 ACLC 525. 
40 Ibid at 528. 
41 (1990) 8 ACLC 533. 
42 Ibid at 543. 
43 (1992) 10 ACLC 253. 
44 Note however that the facts of the case are unusal since the court found that Mr Goldberg had 
actual authority to enter into the transactions despite his appointment as a mere director. 
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the common law exception of being put on inquiry stating that: 
Although [s.164] was undoubtedly inspired by the rule in Turquand's case and is in a 
sense a codification of it, the section does not incorporate the concept of being "put on 
enquiry" and we are obliged to have regard to the assumptions, as defined by the sec-
tion, which the respondents were entitled to make subject to the exceptions in subs.4.45 
Therefore the court in Brick and Pipe supported the view of the statutory ex-
ception given in Lyford. 
Advance Bank Australia Ltd v. Fleetwood Star Pty Ltd & Anor 
In Advance Bank Australia Ltd v. Fleetwood Star Pty Ltd & Anor46 the company, 
Fleetwood Star Pty Ltd held the director's (and his wife's) family home. The direc-
tor fraudulently forged his wife's signature in order to give the family property as 
third party security for an unrelated transaction. In this case the court cited Brick 
and Pipe with approval stating that: 
Whilst [s.164] was derived from the rule in Turquand's case, it seems to me that the 
codification is broader in the protection it extends to a person dealing with a company. 
The codified rule does not attract consideration of those matters which prior to the 
codification might have been considered to have put a person dealing with the company 
upon inquiry.47 
On appeal48 however, Gleeson CJ felt that Parliament probably had not intended 
to limit the operation of s.l64(4)(b) stating that: 
In Lyford...Nicholson J observed that the focus of [s.l64(4)(b)] is on the nature of the 
third party's "connection or relationship with the company". Indeed to ignore that would 
be to render the first ten words of the paragraph otiose. The inquiry is whether that 
connection or relationship was such as ought to have produced the relevant state of 
knowledge. It is impossible exhaustively to state the facts or circumstances that might 
give rise to or involve a relevant connection or relationship. Obvious examples would 
be dealings between a company and a person who is a director or shareholder or 
employee...However, the provision is not limited to such cases, and whilst it is neces-
sary to attend to the language of the statute, it is unlikely that Parliament intended a 
radical narrowing of the qualification to the common law rule.49 
The appeal decision of Advance Bank represents the turning point in judicial 
opinion as to the ambit of the statutory due inquiry exception. 
45 Supra n.43 at 262. 
46 (1992) 10 ACLC 703. 
47 Ibid at 712. 
48 (1993) 11 ACLC 629. 
49 Ibid at 638-639. 
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Bank of New Zealand v. Fiberi Pty Ltd 
The case of Bank of New Zealand v. Fiberi Pty Ltd50 considered circumstances simi-
lar to those in Advance Bank. As for Advance Bank, in Fiberi the company held a 
residential property asset occupied by its directors. This residential asset was used 
by one of the directors (Doyle) to give guarantees and a third party mortgage to the 
bank as security for advances made to other companies of which Doyle was a direc-
tor. Allen J held that the bank was not able to rely on the statutory Indoor Manage-
ment Rule for similar reasons as those given by the High Court in its consideration 
of the common law position in Northside, namely that: 
The bank knew that Fiberi was not a trading company...[and] that there was no apparent 
benefit from the transactions to Fiberi, the company, as distinct from the benefits to the 
man...indeed the material before the bank suggested the contrary. On the reasoning of 
every one of the judges who constituted the bench in Northside...the bank was put upon 
inquiry.51 
On appeal52 Kirby P strengthened the possibility of using the common law due 
inquiry exception in addition to s.l64(4)(b). With reference to Northside, His Hon-
our noted the folly of jumping to extreme conclusions about the ambit of the statute 
without having regard to its practical consequences.53 Kirby P then made an analy-
sis oí Northside drawing parallels with the facts of the case before him with respect 
to the due inquiry exception.54 
Kirby P considered the ambit of s.l64(4)(b) rejecting the view of both Studdert 
J in Advance Bank and the Court in Brick and Pipe that the statute does not include 
the "common law concepts of being put upon inquiry".55 Kirby P clearly stated that 
the common law Indoor Management Rule due inquiry exception can be read as 
included within the operation of the statutory Indoor Management Rule: 
...the [section] is expressed in sufficiently broad terms to indicate that a person dealing 
with a company will be taken to know that certain assumptions are not correct where 
the circumstances of the "connection or relationship with the company" put that per-
son upon inquiry. 
The question of what activates the requirement of an inquiry is..best answered by 
the common law...[which] has produced rules as to the circumstances in which the na-
ture of a transaction or relationship is such as to put the person dealing with the company 
50 (1992) 10 ACLC 1557. 
51 Ibid at 1571. 
52 (1994) 12 ACLC 48. 
53 Ibid at 52. 
54 (1994) 12 ACLC 48 at 54-56; "(i) the transactions were not duly authorised by Fiberi; (ii) the 
purported secretary was not an officer of the company at all; (iii) there was no benefit in the 
transaction for the company; and (iv) the actual secretary, far from being aware of the transaction, 
was ignorant of it and stood to lose by it the house in which she was living". 
55 Supra n.52 at 53-54. 
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on inquiry...[and] does not involve a test more restrictive than that which exists under 
the common law.56 
Comment 
It therefore seems that the later cases point towards the continued operation of the 
common law due inquiry exception within the ambit of s.l64(4)(b). This will en-
sure that the apparent poor drafting of s.l64(4)(b) does not hamper the practical 
realities of being put on notice by a transaction. Whilst the courts have been careful 
to apply the common law due inquiry exception within the ambit of the statute, it is 
suggested that the common law Indoor Management Rule might simply be able to 
operate in addition to s.l64(4)(b). 
The idea that the common law Indoor Management rule due inquiry exception 
might apply in addition to s.l64(4)(b) has not been wholeheartedly embraced by 
other commentators. Horrigan57 has suggested that the cases of Northside and Brick 
and Pipe suggest that s.164 "largely subsumes the common law on indoor manage-
ment, so that there probably scant room for common law notions of being put on 
inquiry".58 Although he does consider it appropriate to "import" the common law 
due inquiry exception59 (a concept similar to the view of Kirby P in the Fiberi ap-
peal) at times where it is impossible to separate the operation of s.l64(4)(b) from 
circumstances putting the outsider on notice where a reasonable person would make 
further inquiry. It is suggested that Kirby P placed a wider interpretation on the 
operation of the common law due inquiry exception, such that if the circumstances 
of due inquiry arise in a case to which the statute applies, then the common law is 
to be considered. Two recent case decisions support this wider view that the com-
mon law due inquiry exception operates in addition to s.l64(4)(b). 
Recent decisions 
Two recent decisions of the Victorian Supreme Court,60 Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd 
v Macquarie Bank61 and Pyramid Building Society v Scorpion Hotels Pty Ltd,62 assist 
in determining the role of the common law Indoor Management Rule due inquiry 
exception. 
Both cases involved circumstances which were similar to Fiberi. In each case 
56 Ibid at 54. 
57 B Horrigan Third Party Securities — Theory, Law and Practice' in Enforcing Securities JA Greig 
and B Horrigan (editors) The Law Book Company Limited 1994. 
58 Ibid. See also B Horrigan 'Contemporary Securities Issues — Principles and Practice', paper 
delivered at Queensland Law Society, Securities VIII, 7-9 October 1994 at p.69. 
59 B Horrigan 'Contemporary Securities Issues — Principles and Practice' paper delivered at Queens-
land Law Society, Securities VIII, 7-9 October 1994 at p.71. 
60 See DS Morrison 'Due inquiry and the lender' Australian Banking Law Bulletin, Volume 12, Number 
3, August 1996. 
61 (1996) 14 ACLC 670, per Hedigan J. 
62 (1996) 14 ACLC 679, per Nathan J. 
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the company debtor in question claimed that the bank was precluded from relying 
on S.164(3) because of the operation of s.l64(4)(b). Both cases considered the am-
bit of the common law due inquiry exception's operation in the application of 
s,164(4)(b). 
Hedigan J in Sixty-Fourth Throne cited Gleeson CJ in Advance Bank63 and Kirby 
P in Fiberi with approval,64 concluding with the view that: 
In the present context the difference between [the bank] being put on enquiry and 
whether [the bank] ought to have known of the want of authority may be more apparent 
than real.65 
In Pyramid Nathan J referred to Northside stating that: 
Pyramid was in fact on its enquiry, but it was insufficiently alert. It was in the same 
position as the bank in Northside. I find the case apposite and I am compelled to draw 
the same conclusions as the majority in that case.66 
Nathan J in Pyramid agreed with the comments by Hedigan J in Sixty-Fourth 
Throne stating that the difference between being put on enquiry and being in the 
position where one ought to know were "the same side as one coin".67 
Nathan J also made a useful contribution to the discussion on the meaning of 
the words "connection or relationship" in s.l64(4)(b) stating that they should be: 
"given their usual and common sense meaning...[including connections or relationships] 
which may be characterised as close...as much as to those...which may be distant or 
scant".68 
Both of these recent decisions make a valuable contribution to the understand-
ing of the operation of the common law due inquiry exception in circumstances 
which involve an application of s.l64(4)(b). Both decisions clearly embrace the com-
mon law notion of being put on inquiry and Nathan J in Pyramid further suggests 
"common sense" in the interpretation of s.l64(4)(b) which in any event supports a 
widening in scope of the section itself. 
63 (1993) 11 ACLC 629 at 638-639; "The inquiry is whether that connection or relationship was such 
as ought to have produced the relevant state of knowledge...it is unlikely that Parliament intended 
a radical narrowing of the qualification of the common law rule". 
64 Supra n.61 at 672. 
65 Ibid at 673. 
66 Supra n.62 at 689. 
67 Ibid at 696. 
68 Ibid at 695. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has examined the extent to which the common law Indoor Management 
Rule due inquiry exception applies to modify the operation and ambit of s.l64(4)(b) 
of the Corporations Law. 
Until the High Court hears a statutory Indoor Management Rule case in cir-
cumstances requiring consideration of s.l64(4)(b), the precise ambit of the applica-
tion of common law due inquiry will remain unsettled. Notwithstanding this, the 
current trend injudicial opinion is that the s.l64(4)(b) exception is sufficiently wide 
to incorporate an application of the common law indoor management rule due in-
quiry exception. Whether s.l64(4)(b) incorporates the common law or whether the 
common law applies in addition to s.l64(4)(b) is a moot point. 
The continued application of the common law will facilitate reasonable and prac-
tical outcomes in the use of s.l64(4)(b). No commentary, including this paper, has 
suggested that the statutory provisions will be less effective or indeed taken over 
by this recognition of the role of the common law. 
Therefore it is suggested that the common law due inquiry exception operates 
in addition to the statutory exceptions contained in s.l64(4)(b) and both the com-
mon law and the statute are necessary considerations for those seeking to rely on 
the S.164(3) assumptions. 
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